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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-3448 
________________ 
 
VINH THANH HO,  
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-07534) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 9, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge 
 
(Filed: June 9, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION**   
________________ 
 
 
RESTANI, Judge. 
                                              
* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, 
sitting by designation. 
 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Plantiff-appellant Vinh Than Ho (“Ho”) appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant-appellee, Allstate Indemnity Company (“Allstate”).  Although the 
parties agree that Ho signed a Rejection of Underinsured Motorist Protection Form (“the 
Rejection”) when he entered into a Business Auto Policy with Allstate, the parties 
disagree about the validity of the Rejection.  The district court held that the Rejection was 
valid and accordingly ruled in favor of Allstate.  On appeal, Ho argues that the Rejection 
does not specifically comply with the requirements of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle 
Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1731(c), and thus reversal is 
required.  Alternatively, Ho argues that we should certify the question of specific 
compliance in the context of § 1731 to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  We will affirm. 
 Ho purchased a Business Auto Policy from Allstate which provided $100,000 in 
liability coverage for two motor vehicles.  On April 14, 2011, in conjunction with 
purchasing the Business Auto Policy, Ho signed the Rejection.  After sustaining injuries 
in an October 6, 2011 motor vehicle accident, Ho sought to recover up to $200,000 in 
stacked underinsured motorist benefits from Allstate because the negligent party in the 
accident did not have insurance sufficient to cover Ho’s losses and damages.  Allstate 
denied the claim, citing the Rejection, and Ho brought suit in the Court of Common 
Pleas, Philadelphia County, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to $200,000 in 
stacked underinsured motorist benefits under the Business Auto Policy.  Allstate removed 
the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction, and the 
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parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment as they do not dispute the facts of 
the case.   
 Pennsylvania law requires insurers to provide underinsured motorist coverage 
unless the named insured rejects those benefits by signing a rejection form prepared by 
the insurer.  § 1731(a), (c).  Ho admits to signing the Rejection, but argues that he is 
entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because the form he signed does not 
specifically comply with § 1731.  See § 1731(c.1) (“Any rejection form that does not 
specifically comply with this section is void.”).  The parties agree that, in addition to the 
statutorily required text,1 the Rejection signed by Ho includes the phrase “If you desire to 
reject this coverage entirely, you must sign the waiver below” between the heading and 
the statutorily required text.2  According to Ho, because the Rejection does not 
                                              
1 Section 1731(c) provides that the rejection contain the following language: 
 
Rejection of Underinsured Motorist Protection By signing this waiver I 
am rejecting underinsured motorist coverage under this policy, for myself 
and all relatives residing in my household.  Underinsured coverage protects 
me and relatives living in my household for losses and damages suffered if 
injury is caused by the negligence of a driver who does not have enough 
insurance to pay for all losses and damages.  I knowingly and voluntarily 
reject this coverage. 
___________________________                                 
Signature of First Named Insured  
_________________ 
Date 
 
2 The Rejection reads: 
(continued) 
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specifically comply with the statute, the policy is reformed by operation of law to provide 
underinsured motorist coverage.3  The district court determined that the Rejection did 
specifically comply with § 1731 and granted summary judgment in Allstate’s favor. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment de novo and view all inferences drawn from the underlying 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper only 
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 Section 1731 provides that underinsured motorist coverage rejections must 
specifically comply with the language set out in § 1731(c), but does not define the phrase 
“specifically comply.”  Although courts have not taken a strictly uniform approach in 
                                                                                                                                                 
B. Rejection of Underinsured Motorist Protection 
If you desire to reject this coverage entirely, you must sign the waiver 
below: 
By signing this waiver I am rejecting Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
under this policy for myself and all relatives residing in my household.  
Underinsured Coverage protects me and relatives living in my household 
for losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the negligence of a 
driver who does not have enough insurance to pay for all losses and 
damages.  I knowingly and voluntarily reject this coverage. 
 
_____________________________                             _________________ 
Signature of First Named Insured     Date 
 
3 Ho also asserts that, because he did not sign a Waiver of Stacking and the policy 
covered two vehicles, he is allowed to add or “stack” the coverage from both vehicles 
under the policy such that he can recover $200,000 in stacked underinsured motorist 
coverage under the Business Auto Policy.  Because we hold that the Rejection did 
properly waive underinsured motorist protection, there is no coverage to be “stacked.” 
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determining whether language added to the waiver renders the waiver specifically 
compliant, the district court constructed a reasoned harmonization of the cases.   
In this case, the additional language did not introduce ambiguity into the rejection 
form, and in fact made the phrase consistent with the rest of the Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law.  See Robinson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F. App’x 85, 88–89 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Am. Int’l Ins. Co. v. Vaxmonsky, 916 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).  
It is a better practice not to supplement the statutorily required text, but in this case the 
Rejection included the entirety of the statutorily required text, the addition did not 
introduce ambiguity into the form, did not change the meaning or scope of the coverage, 
pertained to the underinsured motorist coverage waiver, did not refer to a separate 
rejection form for stacking, and was correctly placed before the statutorily required text 
rather than between the required text and the insured’s signature.  See Robinson, 520 F. 
App’x at 88–89.  The additional language clarifies and emphasizes the gravity of the 
decision to waive underinsured motorist coverage.  Thus, the district court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate.  Ho’s motion to certify the question of 
strict compliance to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is denied. 
We will affirm. 
